The Role of Civil Political Actors in Shaping the Outcome of the War and Charting the Post War Democratization in Sudan

After three years of devastating conflict, Sudan stands at a critical crossroads. The nation faces the grave risk of descending into a stalemate in conflict. Yet it could follow the trajectories of countries such as Mozambique, El Salvador, Liberia, Algeria, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, which endured civil war before moving toward more democratic political systems. This brief piece seeks to analyze the role civilian political forces could play in shaping the outcomes of the war and charting the post-conflict democratization of Sudan.

Background
Sudan’s widely acclaimed 2019 political transition has ultimately unraveled, following the rapid escalation of intra military disagreements into full scale armed confrontation since 2023. Once celebrated for its inspiring nonviolent revolution that ousted longtime ruler Omar al Bashir (1989-2019), the country is now mired in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises and atrocities. What began as a promising experiment in civilian led coalition government has descended into open warfare between two wings of the national defense force. The confrontation has hardened into a protracted stalemate, with the Rapid Support Force (RSF) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) establishing parallel governments in Nyala and Khartoum, respectively.
Amid rival political centers and authorities, the dynamics of the conflict on the ground reveal that neither side has the capacity to decisively defeat the other militarily. While both sides have armed capabilities and external patronage to derail the other, a swift military resolution is unlikely. As the confrontation persists, the parties to the conflict appear to have exhausted their means of achieving victory, leaving Sudan at high risk of descending into a frozen conflict in which each actor controls parts of the country, establishing fragmented authority without effective control over the entire country.

Both SAF and RSF have armed capabilities and external patronage to derail the other, a swift military resolution is unlikely.

Civilian Factional Disagreements
In an effort to consolidate positions lost in battle, both SAF and RSF have enlisted civilian political actors to support the parallel governments they have established in Nyala and Khartoum. The generals deliberately allow the conflict to metastasize beyond a struggle between their respective armies, extending it to civilian political actors and entangling them in alliances and counter-alliances. Although their links are not explicitly declared, many civilian groups in Sudan sympathize with either side in the conflict. Long recognized for their delicate separation from the military and a tradition of inter-party collaboration, Sudan’s civilian political movements have nonetheless been drawn into factional divisions.

SAF and RSF deliberately allow the conflict to metastasize beyond a struggle between their respective armies, extending it to civilian political actors.

At present, there are three major competing civilian political factions in Sudan. Drawn to RSF’s anti Islamist rhetoric, some civilian actors have aligned with the RSF in an effort to dismantle the Islamist re-establishment represented by SAF. Meanwhile, signatories to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), together with Islamist groups, though not functioning as fully reconstituted political parties, appear to have positioned themselves alongside the SAF. A third faction comprises the majority of civilian political actors who identify as independents. However, this self proclaimed independence is contested, with claims and counter claims challenging its authenticity. Beyond the covert or overt relationships each civilian actor has with the major actors of the conflict (SAF and RSF), what divides them is a polarized disagreement over the future role of Islamic movements, Al Bashir’s National Congress Party, SAF, and RSF in Sudanese politics.
This profound factional landscape underscores civilian actors’ limited capacity to advance a democratic transition. In the long run, their close relations with military leaders could help facilitate their integration into ongoing mediation processes and into future democratization under civilian oversight of the military. In the short run, however, such proximity has undermined their legitimacy as non-partisan actors in the ongoing conflict. It has curtailed inter-civilian dialogue and hindered the emergence of an alternative “third pole,” as envisioned in the Nairobi and Addis Ababa initiatives. The absence of a shared vision and a unified front among civilian actors has not only eroded the movement’s credibility but may also provide the armed forces with justification to pursue continued dominance.

Close relations civilian political actors have with warring parties undermined their legitimacy as non-partisan actors hindering the emergence of an alternative “third pole”.

In parallel with efforts to secure a ceasefire, enabling civilian actors to engage in sustained dialogue among themselves and with conflict actors would lay the groundwork for ending the conflict and establishing civilian-led governance in the post-war period. However, this would depend on certain prior conditions. The civilian actors would need to withdraw from their partnerships with the militaries and continue efforts on initiatives in Nairobi and Addis Ababa toward a unified front.
Now more than ever, the end of the conflict in Sudan and the potential for post-conflict democratization require building unified leadership and forming coalitions among civilian political actors. Civilian political forces that maintain collaborative relations with the militaries shall insist that military leaders recognize they can no longer advance through military force and serve as a third party to moderate relationships among the conflict actors through their networks. Transitioning from reliance on foreign-led mediation to strategic engagement with civilian political forces to mediate between the two generals offers a more sustainable path forward.

The end of the conflict in Sudan and the potential for post-conflict democratization require building unified leadership and forming coalitions among civilian political actors.

Revising the Mediation Approaches
Countries in the Gulf and the wider Middle East, in pursuit of their own strategic interests, have become deeply entangled in Sudan’s conflict, each backing opposing factions. Their involvement, often through financing multiple mediation processes, has rendered peace increasingly elusive. For these regional and international actors, pursuing a unified and consolidated line of mediation guided by regional and continental organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU), coupled with the withdrawal of military assistance, is imperative. Major powers such as the United States of America (USA), the European Union (EU), Great Britain (GB), China, Russia, and others, in turn, possess the capacity to reshape the foreign relations of the conflict parties, permanently restricting their access to arms and compelling them toward a negotiated settlement through the imposition of sanctions. The strategic application of coercive diplomacy directed at external actors who provide military and diplomatic support to SAF and RSF, as well as the conflict parties themselves, compelling them to withdraw their support and engage in negotiations, respectively, would be highly pertinent and could facilitate the timely conclusion of the war. This also requires civilian political forces to engage in a process of collective reflection on the political assumptions that have long shaped Sudan’s governance. The international community can support this by creating and sustaining deliberative spaces that enable civilian actors to move beyond the deeply entrenched belief that the military is an indispensable political institution and the ultimate arbiter of political power. Such efforts could capitalize on the current moment, as the mutual exhaustion of the rival military factions and the erosion of their political legitimacy create a rare opportunity to strengthen civilian alternatives and reimagine a political order grounded in civilian leadership.

The strategic application of coercive diplomacy compelling the warring parties to engage in negotiations could facilitate the timely conclusion of the war.

Mediation efforts that aim solely at transactional power-sharing arrangements between the warring factions, while excluding civilian actors, risk perpetuating instability. Such exclusion would not only heighten the likelihood of relapse into conflict but also obstruct prospects for democratization in Sudan. Therefore, now is the time to fundamentally reconsider and revise the approaches that have dominated negotiations since the outbreak of the war, specifically the practice of granting leading roles to conflicting actors in the process. Balancing the inclusion and representation of civilian political actors with military realities on the ground would pave the way for ending the conflict and democratizing Sudan.
A recalibration of the mediation process is required: moving away from a framework that prioritizes bilateral negotiations among conflict actors toward one that incorporates civilian political forces and evolves into inclusive, multilateral platforms that also allow non-conflict actors to participate. While the complete exclusion of conflict actors may not be a realistic proposition, the meaningful inclusion of civilian actors, who command broader constituencies, is a fair and necessary step toward peace. However, drawing on lessons from the immediate years after Omar al-Bashir’s rule, civilian political actors may fare better by not putting forward exaggerated political demands that the current situation in Sudan cannot accommodate. They should be systematic and avoid making excessive revolutionary demands.
Nevertheless, the parameters of ‘civilian political forces’ need to be broadened to include grassroots networks that played key mobilizing roles during the Revolution and provided the much-needed humanitarian support in the ongoing civil war, such as Resistance Neighborhood Committees, professional associations, and women and youth organizations. Strengthening these networks through sustained political, technical, and financial support would broaden civic participation, build more resilient civilian leadership, and promote more representative and accountable politics. Such a bottom-up approach goes beyond the conventional elite power-sharing arrangements, which have repeatedly failed to deliver sustainable peace and stability. It lays the social foundations for a durable, civilian-led democratic transition.

Published on 5, February 2026 in Horn Prospects

By HCD